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MINERAL RESOURCES: TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT
OF RESERVATION OIL AND GAS RESOURCES
THROUGH THE USE OF A NONTAXATION-BASED
TRIBAL JOINT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Quentin Michael Jones*
Introduction
Traditionally, natural resources occurring on tribal lands within a
reservation, including oil and gas resources, have been developed
through a process of leasing. Under this process the.federal gov-
ernment would lease tribal oil and gas to non-Indian developers
in the oil and gas industry, pursuant to the regulations set forth
in 25 C.F.R. § 171 (1979),' under the terms of Form 5-157 (July,
1964).2 Tribal involvement in this process was, also by tradition,
passive if not submissive.
The minimal involvement of tribes in the development of their
reservation resources stems from the federal government's pur-
pose and rationale in selecting the leasing process to carry out its
trust responsibility, i.e., to "make such changes in the manage-
ment and disposition [of tribal property] as it deems necessary to
promote their [tribal] welfare."' Leasing was originally applied to
maintain or increase the "value" of tribal lands, which was con-
sidered diminished because of the inalienable status of trust or
restricted lands.4 It was also recognized that "mining depletes the
*First-place winner, 1981 Indian Law Writing Competition. Third year law student,
University of New Mexico.
1. See also Proposed Reg., 25 C.F.R. § 182, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,173 (Aug. 11, 1980),
which emphasizes "contracting" over leasing of oil and gas resources.
2. Titled Oil and Gas Mining Lease for Tribal Indian Lands. The terms of the lease
provide for, among other things, a 12 V2 % royalty on production, except for that used by
the lessee, which has been increased in some recent leases to 162/%. It also provides for
valuation of oil and gas based upon either the highest price paid or offered at the time of
production, or calculated from the actual volume of marketable product less foreign
substances; a 10-year primary term; and, "reasonable diligence" in development and
operation, or in lieu of drilling, the payment of an amount not to exceed $1 per acre. See
also 25 C.F.R. § 171.19 (1979).
3. Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 485 (1925).
4. Maintaining value by putting tribal mineral land to use is reflected by the follow-
ing: "It has been customary for the Secretary under his general authority over Indian Af-
fairs to make revocable permits on tribal lands which could not be leased under the
statutes in order to preserve the value of the lands and to obtain a revenue from them
rather than allowing them to lie idle." 1 Op. Sol. Dep't Interior 714, 715 (1937).
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property rather than preserving its value." ' Nevertheless, the
leasing of tribal mineral resources to nontribal developers was
seized upon by the federal government not only for tribal benefit
but also for the benefit of the government, the states, and the oil
and gas industry.
6
For tribes, the principal benefit of the leasing process has been
the royalty and rental income received. 7 These forms of income
are free of production costs8 and are free of state9 and federal 0
taxation. Some tribes also have been able to expand and increase
their benefits under the Form 5-157 lease by the incorporation of
stipulations to the lease." In addition, the ease with which a tribe
may enter into a lease and the minimal obligations a tribe must
accept have attracted tribes wishing to develop tribal oil and gas
to the passive role of lessor, especially where the tribe is in the ini-
tial stages of develojpment, or where the tribe does not possess the
requisite technology or financial resources for development.
The problems tribes typically encounter under the leasing pro-
cess generally arise from the limitations inherent in development
through leasing. Once the lease is executed the terms of develop-
ment are sealed; the tribe (and the mineral lessee) must live with
5. Id.
6. For instance, the legislative history of a leasing act lists some other purposes of
leasing: "1. Permit the exploration for oil and gas on Executive Order Indian reserva-
tions. 2. Give the Indian tribes all the oil and gas royalties. 3. Authorize the States to tax
production of oil and gas on such reservations. 4. Place with Congress the future deter-
mination of any changes of boundaries .... 5. Extend relief to permittees and applicants
who in good faith expended money in development looking to the discovery of oil and gas.
." (S.Rept. No. 1240, at p.3; H.R. Rep. 1791, at p.3)" 2 Op. Sol. Dep't Interior 1921,
1922 (1963).
7. Such income includes income from bonus, and advance and minimum royalty
provided for in the terms of the Form 5-157 lease, or stipulations to the lease.
8. Although such royalty may not be free of subsequent-to-production costs, e.g.,
costs of treatment of the product to make it marketable, or costs of transportation to
market. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW-MANUAL OF
TERMS, "Royalty," 511 (1976).
9. See Tax Status of the Production of Oil and Gas From Jicarilla Apache Tribal
Lands Under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 86 I.D. 181 (1979), which amplifies
Tax Status of the Production of Oil and Gas From Fort Peck Tribal Lands Under the
1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 84 I.D. 905 (1977).
10. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 57.
11. Among the stipulated terms commonly incorporated into a lease are the follow-
ing: (1) a five-year primary term; (2) royalty increased to 20 percent, plus a higher ad-
vanced rental amount; (3) inclusion of an "unless" clause; (4) a minimum royalty clause;
(5) a water well conversion clause; (6) a grazing rights protection clause; (7) a preservation
of antiquities clause; and (8) a clause requiring tribal approval of the drilling site location.
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the lease even though its royalty and rental provisions have waned
in the presence of potential profit from decontrolled domestic oil
or gas prices.' 2 This means that the tribe must live with its percep-
tion of "greener pastures." However, not withstanding the prob-
lem of inflexible terms under a lease, the real problem such a
tribe must overcome is that of lease enforcement. Such enforce-
ment does not lie within the province of the tribe but exists as a
function of the Secretary of the Interior, through implementation
by the United States Geological Survey. Unfortunately, this en-
forcement and the protection of tribal interests can be a heavy
burden for the secretary and a disappointment for a tribe.
In Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp.,I3 the court
examined secretarial enforcement of and lessee compliance with
the terms of lease Form 5-157."' In holding the secretary in
breach of trust responsibility for failure to monitor the lessee's
duty to diligently develop, failure to protect against drainage, and
failure to require proper accounting from the lessee, 5 the court
shifted the emphasis of responsibility for performance under the
lease from compliance by the lessee to enforcement by the
secretary. In such a case the relief sought by a tribe for breach of
lease terms does not depend so much on whether there was com-
pliance by the lessee but on whether there was enforcement by the
secretary. Thus, any remedy available to a tribe for a lessee's
breach of lease terms, for example, cancellation of leases, could
be undermined by a finding of breach of trust responsibility by
the secretary. The possible effect of such a determination is relief
without substance-requiring the secretary to enforce leases that
cannot be enforced.'
6
12. See Executive Order 12,287, promulgated as Mandatory Petroleum Price Regula-
tions; Elimination of Newly Discovered Crude Oil Property Verification Requirements,
46 Fed. Reg. 11,804 (1981) (to be codifietd in 10 C.F.R. § 212.)
13. 479 F. Supp. 536 (D.N.M. 1979).
14. Form 5-157 (July, 1964) and Form 5-157 (November, 1947).
15. In holding the secretary in breach of trust, the Court noted that financial and
manpower limitations compound the difficulty of monitoring lease compliance. See J.
Davenport, Assistant Secretary, Energy and Minerals, Davenport Memo in response to
Sept. 7, 1978, order, made of record Mar. 12, 1979, but the Court did not consider such
limitations as an excuse from trust responsibility. 479 F. Supp. 536, 547 (D.N.M. 1979).
16. "The administration of oil and gas leases is normally performed by the Geologi-
cal Survey. Like other federal agencies, its ability to take all possible actions to pursue
every possible avenue in every situation is limited. It must balance its use of resources
against possible benefits. At the present time, the Geological Survey would require a con-
siderable increase in funding and personnel to accomplish the above evaluation for every
NOTES19811
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For tribes wishing to develop oil and gas, or other reservation
resources, leasing offers minimal involvement and responsibility
for development, as well as limitations on tribal income and en-
forcement. In short, tribes have few alternatives under the leasing
process. One alternative recommended by the court in Supron
was the following:
I feel obligated to comment that the more appropriate remedy,
were it available to the Tribe, would be the excision of the
Secretary as the fiduciary through whom the Tribe is obligated
to deal in its affairs with defendants-lessees. Plaintiff, like
many other Tribes in recent times, has demonstrated its desire
and ability to carry on business relations on its own, devoid of
the paternalistic shroud in which it must be enveloped by the
Secretary by virtue of the Tribe's legal status as a ward of the
United States. It is Congress, however, and not the Court who
is empowered to liberate the Indian Tribes from the protection
imposed on them by the United States Government. 7
This alternative could prove useful to tribes if it were selectively
applied, e.g., only to tribal resource or business development,
and if it did not do away with the necessary incentives still needed
by tribes.'" The problem that exists, however, is that Congress
could take an "all or nothing" approach to "liberating" the
tribes, which means termination. The view of the court may be
well intended, but it fails to consider that termination has been
tried and has been found to be a nonproductive enterprise. 19
Thus, another alternative needs to be found and considered.
An Alternative: Joint Development of Reservation
Oil and Gas Resources
As illustrated in Supron, problems that arise from develop-
ment based upon leasing often spring from the inherent adversary
positions the parties must adopt in the lessor-lessee relationship.
On the one hand, the oil and gas industry is attempting to adhere
lease under its jurisdiction. The Geological Survey would, in effect, have to duplicate the
technical staffs of the lessees to carry out this function fully." Davenport, Id.
17. 479 F. Supp. 536, 553 (D.N.M. 1979).
18. See text accompanying notes 9, 10 supra.
19. E.g., Wilkinson & Briggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 139 (1977); Preloznik & Felsenthal, The Menominee Struggle to Maintain Their




to its standards of economical and efficient development; on the
other hand, the tribe is attempting to enforce its lease to ensure
maximum development and income under the terms of the lease.
The benefits that accrue for one party are often seen as exclusive
in relationship to the benefits that accrue for the other party, i.e.,
a gain by one party is considered a loss by the other party.2" An
effective and efficient alternative to leasing must operate to
eliminate or greatly reduce the adversary relationship between the
tribe and the oil and gas industry, that is, tribal oil and gas
resources must be developed for mutual, not mutually exclusive,
benefit.
Although movement away from federal leasing implies devel-
opment by a tribe in its individual capacity, this may not be the
case. For strict self-development to occur a tribe must be willing
to tie up its limited funds in the acquisition of petroleum tech-
nology, equipment, and expertise not possessed by the tribe. Such
an extensive diversion of limited tribal funds from the govern-
mental, social, and community programs of the tribe to a pro-
gram of exploration and development would be far beyond the
capabilities of most tribes. The high costs involved in the location
and drilling of wells could quickly bankrupt even the most afflu-
ent tribes: drilling costs alone can range from $400,000 to $1.5
million per well, depending upon the depth, the geology en-
countered, the need for directional drilling, etc. Thus, for tribes
planning to develop under a program of strictly individual tribal
development, the tribe should be prepared to develop more slowly
and to accept substantial sacrifice.
Many of the obstacles encountered in strict self-development
could be reduced or eliminated by joining with the oil and gas in-
dustry in developing tribal resources for mutual benefit. Under
such a program of joint development each party could provide
20. "I believe it can fairly be said that the mistrust and suspicion on the part of both
the Indian and non-Indian parties to lease negotiations constitute a significant obstacle to
the development of natural resources of Indian lands by the private sector. Indians have
on occasion expressed the sentiment that the white man has cheated the Indian for genera-
tions and that the present crop of industry representatives are attempting to separate the
Indian from his natural resources at less than a fair price. Industry reacts to such charges
with amazement and chagrin, conceding that while Robber Barons may have taken ad-
vantage of Indians 100 years ago, industry today is acting generously and in good faith
and feels the Indians should not take out their resentment for ancient wrongs on the pre-
sent management. The conclusion often reached is that no matter what kind of deal is of-
fered to the Indians, they will never be satisfied." Ferguson, Industry Problems With
Emerging Tribal Roles, in INSTITUTE OF INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT-OIL, GAS, COAL
AND OTHER MINERALS 7 (Rocky Mtn. L. Fdn. 1976).
NO TES1981]
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that which the other does not possess. The tribe could provide the
proven or suspected oil and gas in place which would be clear in
title and free of encumbrance, and the industry could provide the
equipment, technology, expertise, and money required to extract
the reservation resource from the land. The problem that arises
under this mutual or joint approach to development concerns the
difference in value between each party's "contribution" to the
development effort. The industry, by providing all or most all of
the money, hardware, and know-how, could find itself in a much
less favorable position under joint development than under leas-
ing. Thus, a tribe must be able to provide more than unen-
cumbered oil and gas, which is no more than it provides in a leas-
ing situation, if it wishes to achieve its developmental goals.
Nontaxable Status as an Aid to Tribal Self-Development
The only attribute posessed by a tribe that could substantially
increase its bargaining position with respect to joint development
with the oil and gas industry is its nontaxable status"' under the
Internal Revenue Code. 2 This status directly affects a tribe's
economic position by not diminishing tribal profits or income
through the burden of federal income taxation. In addition, the
possibility exists that a tribe could structure its joint development
arrangement with the oil and gas developer in a manner that
would allow the developer to utilize certain tax benefits not
available to the tribe, while allowing the tribe to increase its in-
come and control over reservation oil and gas development. This
possibility has been suggested by one commentator:
Indian tribes are exempt from federal income taxation as well
as state income and resource taxes. As a result, any energy
company contemplating the exploitation of reservation re-
sources should consider the advantages of a project format that
would allow the company to share a portion of available tax
savings. Substantial tax savings can be achieved through care-
ful structuring of the venture to spread the tax exempt tribal
immunity over all or part of the project. As an alternative, a
project can be structured under the tax exempt status so the
21. See text accompanying note 10, supra.
22. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of




taxable partner has a disproportionate percentage of the opera-
tion's federal and state tax write-offs.23
If the commentator's unsupported assertions are valid, a
tribe's nontaxable status could provide the basis for a tribal pro-
gram of development that would benefit all parties. These
benefits could take the following form:
(1) the promotion of tribal responsibility for self-government
through the use of nontribal technology and funding in the ex-
ploration and development of reservation resources, and the ac-
complishment of the tribal goals of increasing control over reser-
vation development, thus maximizing income from development
and minimizing impact on the tribal environment and culture; 2
(2) the creation of a favorable federal income tax environment
for oil and gas developers and investors; and,
(3) the reduction of federal financial and oversight responsibili-
ty for tribal support and development. The overall effect of such
a nontaxation-based program of development would be a tribe's
acceptance of responsibility for its own growth, development,
and economic security, and a shifting of some of the financial
and developmental burden from the federal government to the
private sector.
Notwithstanding the general attractiveness of a nontaxation-
based joint development program, before such a program could
be initiated several basic issues need to be examined to determine
whether it is a conceptually practical alternative. To make this de-
termination, the following must be considered: (a) whether a tribe
truly exists as a nontaxable entity, and, if it does, (b) whether a
tribe's nontaxable status could be used to achieve its development
goals or objectives, and, if it can, (c) in what manner could the
tribe's nontaxable status be applied to accomplish the beneficial
results sought by a joint development program.
Nontaxation of Tribes Under Federal Income Tax Law
"When one examines the treaties made between the United
States and the Indian nations in search of a provision similar to
23. Israel, New Opportunities for Development on Indian Reservations, 32 MINING
ENG'R 651, 653 (1980).
24. The stated purpose and scope of the Proposed Regulations for reservation oil
and gas development adopt similar goals for development. See Proposed Regulation,
supra note 1, to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 182.1(a).
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the following: 'Nor shall said Indian Tribe, or Indians severally
nor their property, real or personal, ever be liable to taxes of any
kind . . .' he finds it missing." ' 21 This apparent absence of ex-
press, unambiguous authority upon which Indian nontaxable or
tax-exempt status can be based has created some confusion as to
the tax status of individual Indians and tribes. This examination
does not concern the federal tax status of individual Indians, who
are subject to federal income taxation,26 unless exempted by treaty,
agreement, or act of Congress, 7 or unless their income is derived
directly from restricted allotted land held in trust by the United
States." In addition, this inquiry does not concern the taxation of
tribes by the state. 29 The focus of this examination rests solely
upon a tribe's status in relation to the Internal Revenue Code.
Authority for Tribal Nontaxibility
The sole express authority for the proposition that Indian tribes
are not subject to the income tax provisions of the Code exists in
25. J. WHITE, TAxING THOSE THEY FOUND HERE I (1972).
26. I.R.C. § 1 imposed a tax upon the taxable income of individuals, which includes
all income from whatever source derived. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 62 & 63(b). "The Act
[Revenue Act of 1918] does not expressly exempt the sort of income here involved, nor a
person having petitioner's status [not protected by the federal trust responsibility] respect-
ing such income, and we are not referred to any other statute which does." Choteau v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 691, 694 (1930).
27. "We agree with the Government that Indians are citizens and that in ordinary af-
fairs of life, not governed by treaties or remedial legislation, they are subject to the pay-
ment of income taxes as are other citizens . . . .But we cannot agree that taxability of
respondents in these circumstances is unaffected by the treaty, the trust patent or the
Allotment Act." Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1955). See also Rev. Rul. 54-456,
1954-2 C.B. 49.
28. See Rev. Rul. 56-342, 1956-2 C.B. 20, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 62-16, 1962-1
C.B. 7, which applies the Capoeman holding and interprets income derived directly from
the land to include rentals, royalties, proceeds from natural resource sales, etc.. See also
Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971), which holds that the income de-
rived directly from restricted land extends to federal land purchased on behalf of Indian
individuals and held in trust; and Rev. Rul. 74-13, 1974-1 C.B. 14, which follows the
holding in Stevens. But see Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295
U.S. 418 (1935), which holds that income derived from reinvesting income directly derived
from trust-allotted land is not tax exempt.
29. See supra note 9, which recites the basis for exemption of tribal royalty and pro-
duction income from state taxation. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S.
145 (1973), where a tribal off-reservation ski business located on lands acquired in trust,
under 25 U.S.C. § 465, and exempt from state taxation, was held not exempt from a non-




Revenue Ruling 67-284,30 which simply states: "Income tax sta-
tutes do not tax Indian tribes. The tribe is not a taxable entity."
3 1
Notwithstanding the clarity and generality of the revenue ruling,
tribes and individuals who wish to rely upon the ruling should
realize that revenue rulings are "limited in scope by the pivotal
facts stated in the Revenue Ruling," ' 32 and should not be relied
upon "unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the
same." 33 In Revenue Ruling 67-284, no facts or circumstances
were presented; thus, the statement should be considered as a
conclusion of law and statement of policy by the Internal Reve-
nue Service. The ruling does not define "tribe" within the appli-
cation of the ruling. Such an omission is not unusual because
"[n]either Congress nor the Executive Branch has prescribed any
standardized definition for either the term 'Indian' or 'Indian
tribe' in terms of the special federal relationships with Indians."
34
The concept of "tribe" has been narrowed in certain situations:
"federal jurisdiction to authorize or secure immunities [from
state, and possibly federal law] . . . does not exist except with
respect to persons or entities which are 'Indians' or 'Indian
Tribes,' respectively, in the political sense as acknowledged by the
United States." ' 3 Thus, the term "tribe" in the ruling could, and
probably does, refer to a tribe in the "political sense" which
would mean it applies to the tribe as a government or to the gov-
ernmental body of the tribe. The effect of applying such a defini-
tion to a joint development program would be that the tribal gov-
ernment, and not a separate tribal organization or group, must be
the entity involved in the development of reservation resources.
Otherwise tribal development could fall beyond the ambit of non-
taxability under Revenue Ruling 67-284.
Finally, individuals or tribes planning to rely upon the ruling
should be cognizant of the actual tribal tax status recognized by
the Service. Some commentators have described tribes as being
"exempt from federal income taxation," ' 36 or have interpreted
pansive immunity from ordinary income taxes that businesses throughout the State [were]
subject to." Id. at 157.
30. 1967-2 C.B. 55.
31. Id. at 58.
32. Rev. Proc. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 693, 694.
33. Id. at 694-95.
34. United States v. Washington, 476 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
35. Id. at 1111.
36. See text accompanying note 23, supra.
1981]
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Revenue Ruling 67-284 as an "exemption from taxation by the
national government." 7 These characterizations of tribal tax
status as based upon some form of "exemption from taxation"
have not accurately construed the language of the ruling.
"Exemption from taxation" has been defined by one source as
follows:
In the broad sense, all property not taxed; in a narrower sense,
the grant of immunity, express or implied, to particular per-
sons or corporations, or to persons or corporations of a partic-
ular class, from a tax upon property or an excise which persons
and corporations generally within the same taxing district are
obliged to pay. 8
Any characterization based upon an "exemption from taxation"
would imply (1) that a tribe was subject to taxation, and (2) that
all or a portion of the tribe or its income has been rendered im-
mune from taxation by a statutory grant, whether express or im-
plied. Such an interpretation does not follow the language of the
ruling.
The ruling states in clear and express language that tribes are
not subject to the income tax statutes and that they are not "tax-
able entities." This means that tribes are not "tax exempt" but
are "nontaxable," i.e., tribes never were and are not now subject
to any of the provisions of the Code. The importance of this dis-
tinction rests upon the effect of tax exemptions: such exemptions
are generally narrow in scope and application,39 and because tax
exemptions are based upon a grant of immunity their existence is
more tenuous, being subject to modification or extinguishment
by the granting body or the courts."' On the other hand, the
status of federal "nontaxation" broadly extends to all tribes ex-
isting as federally recognized political entities, and it is not
limited by statute or decree. In fact, the existence of such a non-
taxable status, as indicated below, stems from the absence of any
statutory authority to the contrary.
37. Fiske & Wilson, Federal Taxation of Indian Income From Restricted Indian
Lands, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 63, 68 (1975).
38. BALLENTINE'S LAW DicT. 435 (3d ed. 1969). See also BLACK'S LAW DICT. 681 (4th
ed. 1968).
39. See notes 28, 29 supra.
40. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 400 U.S.
905 (1980) (Indian commerce clause does not automatically bar all state taxation of mat-
ters affecting the economic and political interests of tribes); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.




A Foundation for the Internal Revenue Service Ruling of Tribal
Nontaxability Under the Internal Revenue Code
Revenue Ruling 67-284 represents an official interpretation of
federal tax law and policy by the IRS.4' However, the absence of
supporting analysis within the ruling has created some confusion
or uneasiness among individuals and tribes who have relied or are
planning to rely upon its conclusion of tribal nontaxability. Thus,
an analysis of the federal Indian law applicable to tribes could
serve to clarify the foundation upon which the ruling was based.
The ruling's conclusion of tribal nontaxability springs from
and is consistent with the concept of tribal sovereignty and the
rules of construction applicable to tribes. In Worcester v.
Georgia, 42 the Court enunciated the basis for the sovereign status
of tribes in relation to the federal government:
From the commencement of our government, Congress has
passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians;
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a
firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.
All these acts . . . manifestly consider the several Indian na-
tions as distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and hav-
ing a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is
not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States..
. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them,
means "a people distinct from others." The Constitution, by
declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to
be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the
previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently, ad-
mits their rank among those powers who are capable of making
treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation," are words of our
own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative pro-
ceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well-under-
stood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have
applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are ap-
plied in the same sense.43
Although the language of Worcester would seem to indicate a
level of tribal sovereignty on par with that of foreign nations, the
41. See generally Rev. Proc. 72-1, supra note 32.
42. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1932).
43. Id. at 556, 559.
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Court had earlier indicated that sovereign tribes were not
"foreign" but were "domestic dependent nations ... [whose] re-
lation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guard-
ian." 4 The Court has further described the "semi-independent
position" of tribes as existing "not as States, not as nations, not
as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social rela-
tions, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of
the State within whose limits they reside." ' 4 And, as the Court
has recently stated, "tribal sovereignty is dependent on and sub-
ordinate to only the Federal Government, not the States.
' 46
Thus, in a hierarchy of sovereign entities a tribe is more than a
state but less than the United States.
Tribes possess all of the attributes of local self-government,
but when exercising tribal functions and authority all such rights
are "subject to the supreme legislative authority of the United
States."147 Or, as also stated by the Court, "Congress has plenary
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the tribes otherwise possess." ' 48 Prior to the
passage of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871,49
Congress defined its relationships with Indian tribes by treaties,
but with the Act Congress terminated treaty-making with Indian
tribes. The effect of this end to treaty-making has been described
as follows:
[Passage of the Act] meant no more, however, than that after
1871 relations with Indians would be governed by Acts of
Congress and not by treaty. [Citations omitted.] The change in
no way affected Congress' plenary powers to legislate on prob-
lems of Indians .... Once ratified by Act of Congress the pro-
visions of the agreements became law, and like treaties, the
supreme law of the land."0
A canon of construction applicable to congressional Indian
legislation requires that such legislation "be liberally construed,
44. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
45. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1885).
46. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154
(1980).
47. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1895).
48. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1977).
49. Codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970).




[with] doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the In-
dians." '5 1 And, where Indian or tribal rights or immunities are in-
volved, the United States Supreme Court, in applying this rule
has recognized that "[a] congressional determination to terminate
[a tribe, or its rights or immunities,] must be expressed on the
face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances
and legislative history."5 2 Thus, where federal legislation would
extinguish any immunity or right, then not only must the Act be
construed liberally with doubtful language resolved in favor of
the tribe, but the language must clearly express or manifest a con-
gressional purpose to extinguish the immunity or right.
This requirement of a clear expression or manifestation from
Congress has created some confusion when applied to statutes of
"general applicability, ' 5 3 which would include the Internal Reve-
nue Code. The applicable rule is that "general Acts of Congress
apply to Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear
expression to [the] contrary."5 " Or, for instance, as applied to the
Internal Revenue Code's taxation of individual Indians who are
not protected by the trust responsibility of the federal govern-
ment:
The intent of Congress was to levy the tax with respect to all
residents of the United States and upon all sorts of income.
The act does not expressly exempt the sort of income here in-
volved [income distributed from tribal royalty income], nor a
person having petitioner's status [held a certificate of compe-
tency] respecting such income, and we are not referred to in
any other statute which does. . . .The intent to exclude must
51. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). See also Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
52. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373
(1976). The Court has also recognized that "Indians stand in a special relation to the
federal government... unless the Congress has manifested a clear purpose to terminate
immunity and [consider] Indians as part of the general community." Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 614 (1943).
53. In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), the Court stated that, "General acts of
Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention
to include them." Id. at 99-100. But, in Blackbird v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 976 (10th
Cir. 1930), the rule announced in Elk was undermined by the Court's view that Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870), upon which Elk was founded, had been
"nullified" by the Supreme Court in United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey,
108 U.S. 491 (1883), because the decision was not made by a majority of the Court. See
generally GETcHas, ROSENFELT & WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 200-204 (1979).
54. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1970).
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be definitely expressed, where, as here, the general language of
the Act laying the tax is broad enough to include the subject
matter. 5
Although "express" congressional intent is required to exclude a
tribe from the application of a general act of Congress, thus
creating a tribal immunity, it is also required to extinguish a tribal
immunity or right. Thus, confusion often remains where a tribe is
not expressly excluded from a general act and also is not expressly
stripped of its rights or immunities.
In such a situation, where conflict exists between traditional
rules of construction, the courts and administrative agencies have
examined the scope of a statute of general applicability in the
context of (1) the federal trust responsibility, and (2) the effect on
tribal sovereignty. The application of general acts of Congress to
tribes or individual Indians has been allowed where the applica-
tion did not breach the trust responsibility of the United States
nor affect the sovereignty of the tribe within the boundaries of
the reservation.", On the other hand, the application of such
general statutes or acts has not been allowed where the applica-
tion would breach or erode federal trust responsibility or infringe
upon the sovereignty of tribal government. 7 Thus, as a general
55. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691, 694, 696 (1931).
56. E.g., statutes of general applicability have been allowed in the following cir-
cumstances: (1) in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), the Court held
that a business enterprise operated outside of the reservation was subject to the state's
general gross receipts tax; (2) in FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1970), the
Court held that nontrust fee land owned by the tribe was subject to the federal eminent
domain power and could be condemned by a federal agency; (3) in Navajo Tribe v.
NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the court held that a non-Indian employer
operating on the reservation was subject to the National Labor Relations Act, but that the
Act had a doubtful effect on the tribe; and (4) in Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1930),
held that income derived from trust income and distributed to an individual Indian not
under federal trust protection, was subject to federal income taxation.
57. E.g., The application of general statutes or acts have not been allowed in the
following circumstances: (1) In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973),
the Court held that off-reservation land held in trust was not subject to the general prop-
erty tax of the state; (2) in FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1970), the
Court indicated that application of federal eminent domain powers did "not breach the
faith of the United States, or any treaty or other contractual agreement" because the
lands were nontrust fee lands; (3) in Fort Apache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976),
the National Labor Relations Board held that the sovereign status of a tribal government
over its affairs within the reservation excluded it from the definition of "employer"
under the N.L.R.A.; and (4) in Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971),
the Court held that income derived directly from land held in trust solely for the benefit
of an individual Indian was not subject to federal income tax.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/7
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rule, where application of a statute of "general applicability"
would infringe upon the sovereignty of tribal government within
the reservation, or would extinguish or erode the rights or im-
munities of the tribe or its members, such an application would
require a clear manifestation or expression from Congress that
such action was intended.
Therefore, in order to subject a sovereign tribe protected under
the trust responsibility of the federal government to the provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, and thus make the tribe sub-
ject to the burden of taxation, application of the general rule
would require a clear, unambiguous expression or manifestation
from Congress that such action was intended. No such congres-
sional manifestation or expression exists." Thus, the conclusion
of the Service in Revenue Ruling 67-284, that "[lincome tax
statutes do not tax Indian tribes [, and that t]he tribe is not a tax-
able entity," 59 is valid and correct.
Tribal Use of the Federal Nontaxable Status in
Tribe-Owned Reservation Enterprises
Accepting the validity and scope of tribal nontaxation for
58. Notwithstanding the absence of express or manifest congressional intent to sub-
ject tribes to federal income taxation, the enactment of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 4991(b)(2), § 4994(d), 94 Stat. 229, has blurred the
"nontaxable" status of tribes which "produce" oil from trust and restricted mineral in-
terests by expressly exempting federally recognized tribes from "windfall profit" taxa-
tion. This blurred view of the tribal tax-free status is reflected in the following: "The
House did not specifically exempt oil produced by Federally recognized Indian tribes.
However, various court decisions and Internal Revenue Service rulings hold income from
Tribal Trust Lands to be exempt from income tax in the absence of a clear Congressional
intention to impose a tax. Thus, it is unclear whether the courts and Internal Revenue Ser-
vice would interpret the House bill as taxing tribal trust oil production." S. REP. No. 394,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1979). The "court decisions and [IRS] rulings" referred to in the
report appear to be those involving a tribal member's receipt of a share of income or
royalty from tribal leases or agreements. E.g., Blackbird v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 976
(10th Cir. 1930); Rev. Rul. 58-320, 1958-1 C.B. 24. Congress could have relied upon or
incorporated by reference Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, to maintain the clarity of a
tribe's federal nontaxable status if it wished tribes to remain wholly nontaxable under the
IRC. But, by expressly including tribes within the application of the windfall profit tax
Congress has undermined and blurred the conclusion of Rev. Rul. 67-284, thus making it
less reliable than before passage of the Act. For a narrow portion of their income, tribes
are currently subject to taxation with an exemption granted for such income derived from
mineral interests held in trust or restricted status and in which the tribe has an "economic
interest" on Jan. 21, 1980.
59. See text accompanying note 30, supra. The I.R.C. imposed taxation only upon
individuals, estates, and trusts under § 1, and upon corporations under § 11.
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federal income tax purposes, the next question is whether a tribe
could use its federal nontaxable status to achieve its development
goals or objectives.
This question was recently considered, in part, in an analogous
situation involving state taxation. In Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,60 the state tax exemp-
tion of a tribe was examined in the context of the tribal power to
impose a cigarette sales tax upon non-Indians within the reserva-
tion and the tribal preemption of concurrent state taxation. In
holding that the state of Washington could impose its tax on
cigarette purchases by nontribal individuals, the Court discussed
some limitations on the tribal use of its state tax exemption:
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smoke-
shops to persons coming from outside is not generated on the
reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant
interest. [Citations omitted.] What the smokeshops offer these
customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an ex-
emption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the power to
create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes or other-
wise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enter-
prises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes could impose
a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores at reservation
borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and
drawing custom from surrounding areas. We do not believe
that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of
pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize
Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation
to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere. 6'
The clear concern of the Court was the possible "marketing"
of a state tax exemption by the tribe in order to create an unfair
advantage for a reservation business over nonreservation busines-
ses. But of apparent greater concern to the Court was the mech-
anism employed by the tribe to encourage tribal business enter-
prises-the preemption of all state taxation on a transaction
which the state was authorized to tax,62 thus allowing the non-
tribal customers to purchase the product free of any state tax
levy. Although such a situation could not occur under an oil and
gas joint development program for federal income tax purposes,
60. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
.61. Id. at 155.
62. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state taxation of on-




the question remains whether a tribe can use its federal nontax-
able status to promote its development goals under the Court's
rationale in Colville. An examination of the Court's rationale
should serve as an answer to this issue.
Setting aside the disparate foundations in law for tribal state
tax exemptions and tribal federal nontaxation, and focusing on
the Court's rationale, a "general rule" for tribal use of its tax-
free status can be constructed. This "rule" derived from the lan-
guage of the Court, could take the form of the following: If the
"value" of a product sold to nontribal individuals on a reserva-
tion is derived solely from a tax-exempt (or nontaxable) tribal
status, and is not produced or generated on the reservation by
activities in which a tribe has a significant interest, then a tribe
does not have the authority to employ such a tax-free status to
create a commercial advantage for tribal business over nontribal
business.
An application of this "rule" to a joint oil and gas develop-
ment program makes apparent a significant difference between
the tribe's use of its tax-exempt status in Colville and the use of
the tribal nontaxable status in the program, i.e., no competitive
business advantage is sought nor would be realized by the tribe as
a result of the program. The tribe's development of its oil and gas
would not be at the expense or detriment of others in the oil and
gas industry, but would be more in the form of cooperation with
the industry. The only advantages that could be realized by the
tribe would be an achievement of the tribal goals of increased
control and income from development and a decreased impact on
the tribal culture and environment.
As indicated by the "rule," the Court considered two elements
essential in determining whether the tribe's use of its tax-exempt
(or nontaxable) status was allowable: (1) the sole reason for trans-
acting business with the tribe was based upon a shift of tax-free
status from the tribe to the nontribal participant, and (2) the sub-
ject of the transaction was produced or generated on the reserva-
tion by activities in which the tribe had a significant interest. Ap-
plying these criteria to the joint development program indicates
that the "rule" in Colville would not disallow a tribe's use of its
federal nontaxable status for such development purposes. First,
the tribe could not shift its nontaxable status to the nontribal par-
ticipant. The tribe in Colville was able to attempt such a shift
because of its conceptually "higher level" of sovereignty6 3 which
63. See text accompanying note 46, supra.
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allowed it to claim that state taxes or laws had been preempted by
tribal law14 or federal law.6" But, no such claim can be made
against the federal government whose sovereignty exceeds that of
the tribe. Moreover, any "shifts" that would occur between the
participants in the joint development program would be only
those allowed under the Internal Revenue Code, and any effect
on the nontribal participant should not be violative of the Code.
Second, the subject matter of the transaction, the oil and gas in
place under the reservation, exists as a vital interest of the tribe,
which is reflected in the desire of most tribes to become actively
involved in the actual production of their reservation resource.
Thus, under the criteria expressed in Colville, a tribe's use of its
nontaxable status should be allowed.
Though remote, another possible limitation could exist on a
tribe's use of its federal nontaxable status under the guise of the
"overriding federal interest" doctrine. This doctrine, which was
discussed in Colville," was described in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe as follows: "Upon incorporation into the territory
of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the
territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of
separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the inter-
ests of this overriding sovereignty.' '67 Under this doctrine one
could argue that a tribe's use of its nontaxable status impinges
upon the United States' sovereign right to levy its income tax
under the IRC by reducing the lawful tax owed by the nontribal
participants. Proponents of such an argument would have to
show that when tribes submitted to the overriding sovereignty of
the United States they also surrendered their right to enter into
any agreements that might affect federal taxation, even though
the tax liability and the decisions affecting such liability are the
sole responsibility of the taxpayer and are beyond the power of
the tribe. Such an argument would have greater impact if the
tribe's use of its nontaxable status totally removed the possibility
of tax liability, rather than just possibly affecting such liability.
64. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (states cannot infringe upon the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.)
65. See, e.g., Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980)
(comprehensive federal regulation of traders on a reservation left no room for the addi-
tional burden of state taxation).
66. See 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (tribal taxation of cigarette sales does not conflict with
any overriding federal interest).
67. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (tribal incarcera-




The effect, if any, of a tribe's nontaxable status occurs as a result
of its primary concern for the development of reservation re-
sources. It would in no way affect the right of the United States
to impose or enforce its income tax upon its citizens. In actuality,
there appears to be little or no possibility that a tribe's tax status,
in the context of reservation development, could frustrate the
federal interest in obtaining revenue.
Although a judicial review would probably be necessary to
resolve this question, the possibility clearly exists that a tribe's use
of its federal nontaxable status as a means of achieving its
developmental goals or objectives would not run afoul of a rule
such as the one presented in Colville, and that it should not tread
upon an overriding federal interest. Such use exists as only one
factor among many that a tribe must consider if it is to accept
and increase its responsibility for the development of reservation
resources. Because such use could be of substantial benefit to a
tribe and the nontribal participants, however, it would be in the
best interest of both to seek some form of clarification upon
which they could rely before implementing the development pro-
ject. Thus, a tribe, in the context of a joint development pro-
gram, should seek a ruling from the Service as to the status of
such a program for federal income tax purposes."
Effect of a Tribe's Nontaxable Status on a Joint Development
Program of Reservation Oil and Gas Resources
Notwithstanding the fact that whether a tribe can use its
federal nontaxable status within the context of reservation re-
source development remains a question to be clarified by the
courts or Congress, but accepting the possibility that such use
would not be found objectionable, the question remaining is in
what manner, if any, could a tribe employ its status of nontaxa-
bility to accomplish the beneficial effects sought by a joint pro-
gram for the development of tribal oil and gas?" An attempt to
answer this question involves the examination of two interlocking
issues: (1) what kind of structure should a joint development pro-
gram adopt that would take into account a tribe's federal nontax-
able status, and (2) what would be the possible effect of such a
structure on the tribal and the nontribal participants?
To premise such an examination, several basic and unalterable
68. See I.R.C. § 7805; Income Tax Reg. § 301.7805-1; and, Internal Revenue Service
Manual-Admin., P(I 1)23-P(I 1)47, P(l 1)68-P(I 1)75 (CCH).
69. See text preceding and following note 24, supra.
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principles should be considered. First, even though tribes are not
subject to the provisions of the IRC,7 ° nontribal participants are
subject to and governed by its provisions; thus the structure of
the joint development program must necessarily comply with the
provisions of the Code and applicable case law. Second,
participant-taxpayers have the right to decrease the amount of
their tax liability or altogether avoid such liability by any lawful
means, 7 and they are generally free to structure their business af-
fairs to be in the their best interests, including the lawful structur-
ing of their affairs to minimize their tax burden." Third, the
burden of the participants' tax liability is dependent upon the
substance, not the form, of their transaction,"' which means that
the form selected for a transaction must have economic reality"
and not exist as a mere sham.15 Thus, an examination of the
structures available to a joint development program not only
must focus on potential benefits but also must ensure that such
structures are firmly grounded in economic substance under the
federal tax laws.
The Structure of a Joint Development Program
The range of structures that could be employed by a tribe in a
joint program for development are limited because such struc-
tures must be consistent with and maintain a tribe's sovereign
status, allow a flexible relationship to exist between the parties,
and provide maximum tax advantages to the nontribal par-
ticipants. These minimum basic requirements would exclude the
traditional corporate structure for the following reasons: (1)
tribal sovereignty would be undermined because a tribe, to the ex-
tent of its involvement in the corporation, would have to submit
to the jurisdiction of the state that granted the charter of incor-
poration;7" (2) a tribe would indirectly render its income subject
70. Excluding §§ 4991(b)(2) and 4994(d) of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax of
1980, supra note 58.
71. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
72. See, e.g., Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
74. See, e.g., Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1977).
75. See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 981 (1979).
76. See, e.g., A.B.A.-A.L.I. Model Bus. Corp Act (rev. 1969). The corporation
would have to file articles of incorporation with the state (§ 55), and maintain an office
and agent within the state (§ 12) for service of process (§ 14). Note: Even if the tribe




to federal income taxation," while the nontribal participants
would be subject to double taxation;78 and, (3) a corporate form
of structure would offer little flexibility to the parties to adjust
for changing circumstances." Almost the same reasons would ex-
clude a Subchapter S corporation as a possible joint development
structure.80
At the opposite end of the range of possible structures is the
joint venture.81 This form of structure would offer the flexibility
required by the parties and would not submit the tribe to the jur-
isdiction of the state. For the purpose of federal income taxation,
a joint venture is included within the definition of "partnership" 82
and is governed by the provisions of Subchapter K. 3 Under these
provisions, partners are individually liable for their income tax.84
Each partner is required to take into account its "distributive
share" of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, whether or not
distributed to it, in order to determine tax liability.85 What consti-
jurisdiction because of the involvement of the nontribal participants. Cf. Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), or could require the tribal corporation to
register as a foreign corporation (§ 112).
77. Under I.R.C. § 11, the corporation would be subject to federal income taxation
on corporate income and on accumulated earnings, I.R.C. § 531, and the nontribal par-
ticipants, but not the tribe, would again be taxed upon distribution of corporate income.
The income received by the tribe would remain subject to taxation at the corporate level if
not at the individual level.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., A.B.A.-A.L.I., §§ 58-70, note 76, supra (amendment of articles of in-
corporation).
80. See I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
81. "The legal relationship known as a joint venture has been defined as a 'special
combination of two or more persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly
sought without any actual partnership or corporate designation,' and also as 'an associa-
tion of persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.' " Beck Chem. Equip.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 840, 848-49 (1957).
82. "Partnership" includes "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unin-
corporated organization through ... which any business, financial operation, or venture
is carried on .... [And, it] is broader in scope than the common law meaning ... and
may include groups not commonly called partnerships. See section 7701(a)(2)." Reg. §
1.761-1(a). "Whether parties have formed a joint venture is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by reference to the same principles that govern ... whether persons have formed a
partnership ... for tax purposes .... [Tihe essential question is whether the parties in-
tended to, and did in fact, join together for the present conduct of an undertaking or
enterprise." Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077 (1964).
83. See I.R.C. §§ 701-71.
84. I.R.C. § 701. See also I.R.C § 703 (computation of income and deduction, and
elections affecting taxable income made at the partnership or individual level).
85. Income Tax Reg. § 1.702-1(a).
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tutes a partner's distributive share of a joint venture is deter-
mined either by the provisions of the joint venture agreement,86
or by the proportionate interest in the joint venture owned by the
partner where the agreement is silent as to the partner's distribu-
tive share, or where a special allocation of income, gain, loss,
etc., in the agreement lacks "substantial economic effect." 87 Be-
cause each partner is taxed individually, use of the joint venture
form of structure would allow a tribe to retain wholly the federal
nontaxability of its distributive share of joint venture income. It
could also allow a nontribal participant lawfully to decrease his
tax liability by means of "special allocations" authorized under
the joint venture agreement, which could have a "substantial
economic effect."88 It is through such allocations in the agree-
ment that the tribe and the nontribal participants would attempt
to shift the benefits and burdens of the joint venture for their
mutual benefit.
The Effects of Structure: Limitations Encountered in
a Joint Development Program Employing a
Traditional Joint Venture Form
Section 704(b)(2) special allocations under the
test for"substantial economic effect"
Other than some incipient difficulties facing the development
of trust property,8 9 one of the initial questions with which a joint
development program must contend is whether the special alloca-
tion made pursuant to the joint venture agreement exerts a "sub-
86. I.R.C. § 704(a).
87. I.R.C. § 704(b), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, see note 114, infra.
88. Income Tax Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) describes "substantial economic effect in the
following: "whether an allocation has 'substantial economic effect,' that is, whether the
allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of partners' shares of the total partner-
ship income or loss independently of tax consequences ......
89. The Office of the Solicitor, Department of Interior, has expressed its view in an
undocumented opinion that, under current law, the Secretary of the Interior does not
possess the authority to approve partnership-joint venture agreements which vest an
economic interest in trust property in nontribal or non-Indian individuals or organiza-
tions. Notwithstanding numerous secretarial approvals of such agreements prior to this
opinion, the Department of Interior has proposed legislation to remedy this technical
oversight. Interview with Phillip S. Deloria, Director, American Indian Law Center
(formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs), in Albuquerque, N.M. (Feb. 13,
1981). This "problem" should be easily overcome by a contribution of a leasehold inter-




stantial economic effect" 9 and applies to all special allocations,
i.e., allocations that vary from the general allocation of profit
and loss in the joint venture, 91 and which are expressed, orally or
in writing, in the original agreement or in a modification to the
agreement. 92 What constitutes the elements or substance of the
test has been slow in evolution and the subject of much commen-
tary.93
The Service has provided little guidance as to the substance or
scope of the test9 4 beyond the description provided in the regula-
tions,'9 5 which one commentator has interpreted as follows:
90. The "substantial economic effect" test was added to I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976. Prior to its codification it was the principal test employed to
determine if an allocation's "principal purpose" was the "avoidance or evasion" of a
tax, which was the previous § 704(b)(2) standard. The phrase first appeared in the Senate
Finance Committee Report on the 1954 Code, "and was apparently added . . . to allay
fears that special allocations of income or deductions would be denied effect in every case
where the allocation resulted in a reduction in the income tax liabilities of one or more of
the partners. The statement is an affirmation that special allocations are ordinarily to be
recognized if they have business validity apart from their tax consequences." Orrisch v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395, 400, 401 (1970). The test is to be applied "as presently
interpreted by the regulations and case law." S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100
(1976).
91. Under I.R.C. § 702(a)(8), a partner's general allocation of profits and losses in
his distributive share of profits and losses stated in the joint venture agreement. Items
which can be specially allocated to one or more partners are those items listed in §§
702(a)(1) through 702(a)(7), which must be separately stated by a partner in computing his
tax liability, plus any item listed in Income Tax Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i), e.g., intangible
drilling costs, which requires that § 702(a)(8) items, e.g., depreciation and depletion, must
be separately stated also if they are subject to a special allocation.
92. I.R.C. § 76; Income Tax Reg. § 1.761-1(c). See, e.g., Kresser v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 1621 (1970) (oral modification of agreement held invalid because not made
according to terms of the agreement). "Such modification[s] relate back to the beginning
of the partnership year in which the modification occurs. See David A. Foxman, 41 T.C.
535, 554 ... ." Id. at 1628.
93. See, e.g., Cowan, 283 T.M., Partnerships-Distributive Shares-Disallowance
of Special Allocations: A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 25.03A (2d ed. Supp. 1980);
Kamin, Partnership Income and Loss Allocations Before and After the Tax Reform Act
of 1976, 30 TAX LAW. 667 (1977); Houghton & Houghton, SpecialAllocations: Is the Ser-
vice Giving New Meaning To "Substantial Economic Effect"? 28 0. & G. TAX Q. 1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Houghton & Houghton]; Comment, Partnership Allocations
and Capital Accounts: A Technical Advice Memorandum as Administrative Minefield, 35
TAX LAW. 441 (1980).
94. The Service will not issue an advance ruling or determination letter on whether
an allocation of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit, or an item thereof, has substan-
tial economic effect. Rev. Proc. 74-22, 1974-1 C.B. 496, superseding Rev. Proc. 74-22,
1974-2 C.B. 16, and Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 C.B. 719.
95. See note 87 supra.
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Thus, it is possible to tell in most cases whether a special
allocation has an economic effect by asking whether the total
number of dollars a partner is entitled to receive (other than by
way of tax deductions and the like) is increased or decreased by
the special allocation, i.e., would he receive the same amount
of dollars if there were no special allocation. If he would
receive the same amount of dollars, the allocation does not
have an economic effect.
96
Early decisions involving special allocations either did not provide
an analysis of substantial economic effect, 97 or resolved the issue
without reference to the test, e.g., finding the allocation more
closely resembled a "loan" rather than "a true modification or
readjustment of the partner's distributive shares .... .""
The form of analysis presently employed by the courts and the
Service to determine substantial economic effect involves an
examination of the effect of the special allocation on the capital
account99 of the partner receiving the allocation. The framework
for this analysis was established by the court in Orrisch v. Com-
missioner,00 when it announced the following principles for
determining the existence of a substantial economic effect: (1) as
a general rule, the economic burden created by a special alloca-
tion must be borne by the party receiving the allocation, and to
reflect this burden, the special allocation must operate to increase
or decrease the capital account of the party receiving the alloca-
tion;' ' (2) such a party's capital account should be adjusted to
account for any disparity between partners' accounts either by
making a contribution to the partnership, or by proportionately
reducing his share of partnership assets at liquidation of the part-
nership;102 and, (3) partners cannot use "prospective tax benefits
96. Cowan, supra note 93, at A-5.
97. See Rev. Rul. 68-139, 1968-1 C.B. 311 (special allocation of intangible drilling
costs held to have substantial economic effect, without analysis).
98. Kresser v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
99. The joint venture agreement establishes capital accounts, which usually consist
of the partner's original investment plus any additional capital contributions and any ac-
cumulated profits, less any distributions in reduction of capital and any distribution of
losses. See, e.g., 2 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 318 app. (2d ed. 1976).
100. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1973) (disallowed
special allecation of all depreciation to partner with excess income from other source, and
where other partner could not use depreciation due to excess losses from other source).
101. 55 T.C. at 403.




*.. as the medium for equalizing their investments," 0 3 i.e., their
capital accounts. The court applied these principles and found
that the special allocation did not "actually affect the dollar
amount of the partner's shares of the total partnership income or
loss independently of tax consequences," and thus did not have
substantial economic effect within the meaning of Regulation §
1.704-(b)(2).
The basic analysis of Orrisch was applied in Harris v. Commis-
sioner, 0 4 which affirmed the substantial economic effect of an
"arm's-length" transaction in which all of the parties wished to
"clearly delineate" their respective tax burdens, and which
resulted in an "exact equivalence between the amount of loss and
the economic effect as among the partners. . .. '" ' In Magaziner
v. Commissioner,' 6 the court reaffirmed and simplified the Or-
risch capital account analysis when it announced:
In other words, the partner who benefits from a special alloca-
tion of tax deductions must bear the entire economic cost
[burden] of such deductions. Accordingly, if the allocation of
an item of income or deduction to a partner is reflected in his
capital account and the liquidation proceeds of the entity are
distributed in accordance with the capital accounts, the alloca-
tion has substantial economic effect.'
0 7
The language of the court approving a special allocation resulting
in "exact equivalence" or requiring a special allocation recipient
to "bear the entire economic cost [burden]" of the allocation,
has apparently spurred the Service to adopt the view that a
special allocation must exert a dollar-for-dollar economic effect
on the capital accounts at liquidation of a joint venture in order
to have a "substantial economic effect."'0 8 This view, which has
been the subject of commentary and criticism,' °9 appears to be a
move away from the concept of substantial economic effect ex-
103. Id. at 402, n.5.
104. 61 T.C. 770 (1974).
105. Id. at 786.
106. 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 867 (1978) (special allocation of depreciation denied).
107. Id.
108. Technical Advice Memorandum 7707260880A (July 26, 1977), discussed in Fed.
Tax Coord. (RIA) 49 (Feb. 22, 1979). The letter ruling, while confined to the specific
facts of the case presented, indicates the view of the Service in light of applicable law,
regulations, and case precedent.
109. See Houghton & Houghton, and Comment, supra note 93.
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pressed in the regulation, i.e., that an "allocation may actually
affect" the partners' shares of income or loss,110 toward a con-
cept that an allocation must have a definite effect on the part-
ners' shares at liquidation according to their capital account pro-
portions irrespective of other considerations, e.g., risk of loss or
the economic reality of the transaction,"' or whether the alloca-
tion has a "business validity" consistent with the historical
customs of the oil and gas industry." 2 Thus, under the decision
of the courts and the interpretation of the Service, the test ap-
plied to determine the validity of a special allocation under IRC §
704(b)(2) appears to have become rigid in scope and strict in ap-
plication.
Limitation on deductions available to a joint venture
to the "amount at risk" under section 465
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,"
many high-income individuals were able to offset or eliminate
their tax liability through investment devices commonly referred
to as "tax shelters." The function of these devices has been de-
scribed as follows:
[I]n general, they all allow taxpayers to offset certain "artificial
losses" (that is, noneconomic losses, but losses which are avail-
able as deductions under the present tax laws) not only against
the income from those investments but also against the tax-
payer's other income, usually from his regular business or pro-
fessional activity. A major purpose of these investments for
most taxpayers is to reduce the tax liability on their regular in-
come."'4
And the basic elements of an oil and gas tax shelter have been de-
scribed in the following:
The principal features of the oil and gas tax shelter included:
110. Note 88, supra (emphasis added). See Houghton & Houghton, supra note 93.
111. Houghton & Houghton, supra note 93, at 15-19.
112. See supra note 90 and Larson, Distinctive Features of Oil and Gas Allocations
Yielding Tax Benefits for Partners, 49 J. TAX. 362, 366 (1978).
113. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified within
various sections of 26 U.S.C.), as amended by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600,
92 Stat. 2763, and the Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, 94 Stat.
194.
114. Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, Overview of Tax Shelters, 94th





(1) the immediate deduction of intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs; (2) the use of leverage through nonrecourse loans
so that the limited partners are able to deduct expenses in ex-
cess of their actual equity investment in the partnership without
being personally liable on the loans; and (3) conversion of
ordinary income into capital gains.' 5
In an effort to eliminate some of the abuses caused by such de-
vices, Congress enacted IRC § 465. This section limits the amount
of loss an individual can claim for income tax purposes to "the
aggregate amount . . . to which the taxpayer is at risk. ' "1 6 The
limitation does not apply to corporations unless they are "small
business" corporations or "closely held" corporations." 7 The
taxpayer's amount at risk includes contributions of cash (at the
time made) and income less deductions which are not withdrawn,"'
plus the adjusted basis of contributed property less any nonre-
course encumbrances, and less the adjusted basis of any property
withdrawn,' plus any excess depletion not deducted,' 20 and,
plus a share of joint venture liability to the extent personally
liable.'' The amount at risk does not include amounts borrowed
from persons who have an interest in the activity, other than that
of a creditor, and amounts borrowed from "related taxpayers"
within the meaning of IRC § 267(b),' 2 2 or any amounts protected
against loss through nonrecourse financing, guarantees, stop loss
agreements, etc.,' 3 and a taxpayer's amount at risk cannot be
reduced below zero. 
24
The intent of the "at risk" rules, to eliminate arrangements
that insulate taxpayers from "economic loss,"'2 5 has probably re-
duced the number of tax-sheltered financing arrangements avail-
able to speculative drillers. But, in doing so, they also reduced the
general effectiveness of attracting nonindustry investment to oil
and gas joint ventures in need of funding. In arriving at its deci-
115. Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, Tax Shelters: Oil and Gas Drilling
Funds, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (Comm. Print 1975).
116. I.R.C. § 465(a); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-1(d).
117. I.R.C. § 465(a); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-1(d).
118. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1)(A); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-22.
119. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1)(A); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-23.
120. Prop. Reg. § 1.465-45(d).
121. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-24.
122. I.R.C. § 465(b)(3); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-8.
123. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-6.
124. I.R.C. § 465(e); Prop. Reg. § 1.465-3.
125. Senate Comm. on Finance, Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, S. REP. No.
938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 57, 87.
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sion to implement the rules, Congress balanced the small indep-
endent driller's need for nonindustry financing against increasing
intra-industry profits which could be used to finance the
country's need for new wells, and came down on the side of in-
tra-industry financing.126 This approach tends to favor the larger
driller-producer over the smaller independent driller, who has less
access to funds than its large corporate or multicorporate rival.
Thus, under present law, joint ventures in need of financing for
exploration and development will encounter greater difficulty in
locating it because of the greater restrictions imposed.
Effect of a tribe's federal nontaxable status
on problems encountered employing a traditional
joint venture structure
The "substantial economic effect" test in IRC § 704(b)(2) and
the limitation on deductions to the "amount at risk" in IRC §
465 were designed and incorporated into the Code to restrict
specific activities or transactions commonly found in oil and gas
joint venture or partnership arrangements. In addition to these
provisions, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Revenue Act of
1978 enacted further provisions that restricted oil and gas joint
venture or partnership transactions: IRC § 57(a)(11) added "in-
tangible drilling costs" to the list of tax preference items subject
to the "minimum tax" imposed by IRC § 56(a), unless tax liabil-
ity would be greater by application of the "alternative minimum
tax" under IRC § 55127 and IRC § 1254, which provided for the
"recapture" of intangible drilling costs as ordinary income upon
the disposition of the oil and gas property.'28 These provisions,
when combined with earlier restrictive provisions, e.g., the almost
total elimination of percentage depletion under IRC § 613A, have
reduced the incentive to employ joint ventures as the vehicle for
the development of oil and gas resources, especially in light of the
exclusion of corporations from the application of most of the
provisions. In such a climate, a joint development program be-
tween a tribe and a nontribal participant would encounter con-
126. See note 115, supra, at 7.
127. The inclusion of intangible drilling costs as items of tax preference was designed
as a deterrent to the current deduction as items of expense, as allowed under I.R.C. §
263(c). The provisions do not apply to corporations. I.R.C. § 57(a).
128. The recapture of intangible drilling costs was designed to limit the conversion of




siderable difficulty in creating a favorable federal income tax en-
vironment for the nontribal participant.
In the context of a traditional joint venture structure the fed-
eral nontaxable status of a tribe does not appear to provide any
aid to the nontribal participant. For instance, some special alloca-
tions under the Code cannot be made by a tribe. Because a tribe
exists as a nontaxable entity it does not have many of the attri-
butes of a taxable entity that could be allocated to a nontribal
participant, i.e., the tribe has no deductions or credits that could
be allocated because such items only exist under the Code. ' 29 The
tribe could allocate income or profit from a joint venture activity,
but an allocation or shift of those items would not further the
joint development goals of either party. 3 ' The only item a tribe
could allocate would be an "economic loss" suffered by the tribe
within the joint venture. Under the Orrisch line of cases and rul-
ings, such special allocation would require the nontribal partici-
pant to bear the entire economic burden (cost) of the allocation
by reducing its capital account and its share of liquidation pro-
ceeds. This form of special allocation is not uncommon in joint
venture agreements, although it is usually accompanied by a pro-
vision that would allow the nontribal participant to recoup such
losses in subsequent years,' 3 ' thus allowing the participant to en-
joy the advantage of currently deductible losses (to the extent
allowed by the amount at risk). Nevertheless, because the tribe
has no "paper" deductions or credits it could allocate (deprecia-
tion, depletion, or investment credit) and could only shift the
burden of its economic losses, its nontaxable status does not ap-
pear useful as a means of encouraging nontribal participants and
investors to enter into traditional joint venture based programs
with the tribe.
The result does not appear different when applied to any other
provisions of the Code, e.g., "at risk" provisions of IRC § 465.
Because the Code, as recently amended, has centered its attention
on restricting the taxable activities of the individual, it has created
129. Cf. Snell v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A. 1081 (1928) (individual Indian wishing to
offset taxable income from other sources was denied a deduction for depletion because of
the tax-exempt status of the depletable property; the purpose for allowing deductions
does not exist where the party is not subject to federal income taxation).
130. See text preceding and following note 24 supra.
131. See 2 WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 322-24 app. (2d ed. 1976) (Alternative
Provision: Special Allocation of Net Loss if a Partner is Guaranteed against Partnership
Losses in Excess of His Capital Investment).
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a taxable burden that a tribe cannot readily influence. That is, the
income tax burden of the nontribal participant is dependent upon
its own individualized fact situation (e.g., whether it is a corpora-
tion, or the amount it has at risk, etc.) which exists independent
of the tribe and its nontaxable status. Thus, in a traditional joint
venture structure, the tribe's federal nontaxable status could do
little to accomplish the beneficial effects sought by a joint pro-
gram for the development of tribal oil and gas. This does not
foreclose the possible use of a joint development type program
for development of resources, but it does mean that tribes should
look at other alternatives beyond the traditional joint venture ap-
proach.
An Alternative: The Use of Packaged
Oil and Gas Development projects
For a tribe seeking an alternative to the lease-only system of
the federal government, the alternatives it could employ are
limited.' 3 The traditional joint venture-partnership approach of-
fers an opportunity for increased flexibility, control, and income
for a tribe, but it provides little incentive to the oil and gas in-
dustry for participation in such an approach. Thus, a tribe should
attempt to structure an alternative that would work toward the
benefits embodied in a joint development program,"' but which
would be less restricted by the effects of the Internal Revenue
Code.
This alternative could exist in the form of a tribal program for
self-development which would employ the lease of prepackaged
oil and gas development projects to participants within the oil
and gas industry. Under such a program, the "package" offered
for lease would have two components: (1) a lease of a fractional
interest in tribal oil and gas, and (2) the sale-leaseback of equip-
ment and technology required to develop reservation oil and gas.
The inclusion of the oil and gas lease in the package would pro-
vide the lessee with a depletable economic interest in the oil and
gas in place to the extent of the fractional interest of the lease.
The balance of the production income would flow to the tribe
based upon the fractional interest not granted in the lease. The
lease would also provide for bonus, royalty, delay rental, etc.,
payments to the tribe, although such items could be varied,
132. See note 89, supra.
133. See text preceding and following note 24 supra.
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negotiated, or virtually eliminated, according to the requirements
of the project.
The second component, the sale-leaseback, 34 would involve
two separate but integrated transactions. In the first transaction,
the tribe would purchase the equipment and other assets involved
in the exploration, drilling, and production of oil and gas, which
would qualify for depreciation"' and investment credit, 36 from
the lessee-participant. The sale of this equipment, and its subse-
quent leaseback, must comply with the guideline provisions of
Revenue Procedure 75-21.111 Under these guidelines, the tribe
must make and maintain an unconditional investment of at least
20% of the cost of the equipment purchased; and the ultimate
lessee cannot furnish any part of the cost or provide any loans or
loan guarantees to the tribe. The tribe may be able to finance the
balance of the purchase price with nonrecourse notes repaid solely
from rents received and secured solely by the equipment, 31 with-
out jeopardizing depreciation or investment credit if the mini-
mum investment is maintained and the notes are not secured by
production.' The sale, in order not to be considered a "condi-
tional sale," 140 must clearly reflect the tribe's intent to hold the
equipment after the term of the lease. Thus, particular attention
must be paid to the structure of the lease.
134. See generally Walthall, 12-5th T.M. Equipment Leasing: Comment, Leveraged
Leasing: IRS Versus The Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1133 (1979); Javaras & Nelson,
The New Leveraged Lease Guidelines, 53 TAXES 388 (1975).
135. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-1 C.B. 548, 552, at 13.1 & 13.2.
136. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(1).
137. 1975-1 C.B. 715, as supplemented by Rev. Proc. 75-29, 1975-1 C.B. 752. Section
201(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, enacted Aug. 13, 1981, which added
I.R.C. § 168(f)(8), and the Temporary Reg. § 5c.168(f)(8), T.D. 7791, 46 Fed. Reg.
51,907, amended and supplemented by T.D. 7795, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,148, created "safe
harbor" rules that guarantee that a transaction will be treated as a lease for the purpose
of allowing investment credit and capital cost recovery. Whether a tribe or its lessee-
participant could make use of the "safe harbor" provisions may depend on whether the
tribe would be considered a "corporation" for the purpose of the provisions. Applicable
federal and state law should aid such a determination. See, e.g., Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, § 16, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1977) (tribe as corporation under federal law), and
1978 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-9-1 (Pueblo as corporation under state law).
138. Although restricted to the facts presented in the letter ruling, the Service
recognized the use of nonrecourse notes for the balance of the purchase price which were
secured solely by the purchaser's interest and title in the equipment. Principal and interest
were solely payable from rent. And, the lessee was obligated to obtain third party com-
mitments for purchase of the notes from the lessor. See Doc. 7917033 (Jan. 24, 1979).
139. See Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-35 I.R.B. 7.
140. See Rev. Proc. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
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In the second transaction, the tribe would lease the equipment
back to the lessee-participant. In doing so, the lease must comply
with the guidelines provided in Revenue Procedure 55-540,'" in
order not to be classified as a "conditional sale": that is, no
nominal lessee purchase option; lessee cannot acquire title after a
certain number of payments; no portion of rent should appear as
interest, etc. And, the lease must comply with the "leveraged
lease" guidelines of Revenue Procedure 75-21 and Revenue Pro-
cedure 75-28,142 by ensuring that the tribe's residual investment in
the equipment at the end of the lease term will match the 20%
minimum investment requirement amount, and that the lease
contains no provision allowing the tribe to abandon the equip-
ment or allowing the lessee an option to purchase. In addition,
the lease must provide for rent at a profitable level for the tribe.
The tribe also should recognize that the more liberal judicial re-
quirements for determining the validity of a sale-leaseback trans-
action,' 4 3 which previously have been applied primarily to real
estate transactions, have also been applied to the leveraged leas-
ing of equipment. 4 4 Notwithstanding such case law, the tribe
should adhere as closely as possible to the requirements estab-
lished by the Service.
Although some authority exists for the proposition that a
seller-lessee can take depreciation and investment credit on a
leveraged lease transaction, 45 the general rule is that an allow-
ance for depreciation is dependent upon an economic investment
or basis in the depreciable property. 146 This would mean that if a
tribe is not allowed to take depreciation on the property it
holds,' it could not pass on any investment credit 148 because the
property would no longer fall under the definition of property
subject to investment credit. 149 The lessee still would be able to
claim depreciation or an annual deduction in lieu of depreciation
141. Id.
142. 1975-1C.B. 68 (requirements for taxpayer presented information).
143. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). See also Com-
ment, supra note 134 at 1170.
144. See Davis v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (P-H) 1441 (1978).
145. E.g., Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87; Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66.
146. See I.R.C. § 167(a) & (g). E.g., Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.-No. 6, 75.6
(P-H) T.C. (Oct. 24, 1980).
147. See text at note 129, supra.
148. I.R.C. § 48(d)(1).




for any permanent capital improvements made on the leased
property.5 0
If a tribe wished to retain depreciation and investment credit in
order to increase the "value" of its development package, then it
could take remedial action in the form of an equipment leasing
joint venture. Such an enterprise should not be subject to the
restrictions applicable to the development of trust property.' 5' To
minimize the adverse effects of the Code on the joint venture, the
tribe should seek only corporations" as participants so that invest-
ment credit could either be passed on to the lesseq or retained by
the corporate participant."' The tribe could provide, in the joint
venture agreement, for tribal use of the equipment, and for
subsequent purchase of used equipment for use in its own
development.
The effect of a tribe's use of prepackaged development pro-
jects should be beneficial for all parties. The tribe would realize a
greatly increased share of production and rental income, and it
could control development of oil and gas within the reservation
through careful project planning. The lessee-participant would
realize depletable production and income, and would also have
current deductions for rental payments on the equipment, as well
as any pass-through of investment credit. The nontribal joint ven-
ture participant could have its distributional share of profit, loss,
depreciation, interest expense, and investment credit, if not passed
on to the lessee.
Conclusion
Although tribes may possess substantial oil or other resources
within the reservation, they are not using such resources in their
best interests until they take an active role in the development of
those resources. In order to assume this role, tribes must be
aware of the development alternatives available to them and what
effect these alternatives would have on both the tribe and the oil
and gas industry. This means that a tribe should include some
form of tax planning in their selection of a development alter-
native. I 3 Such planning is commonly employed in the oil and gas
150. Income Tax Reg. § 1.167(a)-4.
151. See note 89 supra.
152. I.R.C. § 46(e)(3).
153. When considering the tax aspects of a program, tribal planners should keep the
following in mind concerning the structure of the program: "The building may not be
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industry to gain the maximum benefit for the industry. Thus, if
the tribes wish to realize maximum benefits they must also ex-
amine and exploit tax planning and any other approaches that
will enhance their goals for reservation development.
constructed entirely from the tax advantage, but, if the foundation and bricks have
economic substance, the economic or financial inducement of the tax advantage can pro-
vide the mortar." McLane v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 140, 145 (1966), aff'd per curiamn
377 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968).
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